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The C-130J is an advanced automation aircraft flown with a smaller crew than its tactical airlift
predecessors. It is seeing increased action in theater. The Air Mobility Command sponsored a
multi-prong project to improve C-130J aircrew training for operations in high threat environments:
(1) analyze C-130J and related platform (C-130 E/H, C-17) mishap reports, (2) survey C-130J
crew real world experiences regarding threats to safety, and (3) observe C-130J crews as they plan
and execute a challenging, tactically relevant simulator scenario. The Air Force C-130J safety
record is enviable—no crew-caused Class A mishaps and low rates across all mishap categories
relative to other airlift platforms. Human factors frequently cited in Class B and C reports included
checklist errors, distraction, task prioritization, and decision making. Incident and mishap reports
both frequently mention problems arising from events external to the crew. In the real-world
experience survey, several crews described events that closely paralleled events in the simulator
scenario. During the challenging simulator scenario, crews generally accomplished the mission but
quality of performance varied considerably. Lower performing crews often struggled with risk
management during planning and mission evaluation during execution. They also tended to underutilize their loadmasters and had difficulty choosing the most appropriate levels of automation
during mission execution. Recommendations included an increased emphasis on threat and error
management during training and addressing specific skills at particular points in the syllabus.
A longstanding and central role of human error in aviation mishaps is well documented. For example,
Helmreich and Fouchee (1993) reported that, from 1959 to 1989, flight crew actions were causal in more than 70%
of worldwide air carrier accidents involving aircraft damaged beyond repair. More recently, researchers are
reporting diminishing proportions of air carrier mishaps world-wide being attributed to operator error. Baker, Qaing,
Rebok, and Li (2008) reported a statistically significant drop in air carrier mishaps involving human error, from 42%
in the 1980s to 25% in 1998-2002. Dismukes, Berman, and Loukopoulos (2007) reported that rates of “crew caused”
accidents dropped by 50% between 1978-1990 and 1991-2001. While mishaps attributed to crew error may be
declining, they still represent a large portion of the total count, so the nature of that error remains an obvious issue.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported that 68% of crew-caused accidents from 1989-1990
involved tactical decisions, especially the failure to execute a go-around given an unstable approach, and 84%
involved inadequate monitoring/ challenging (NTSB, 1994). Dismukes and his colleagues analyzed more recent
(1991-2001) NTSB reports and found 19 US air carrier accidents where crew error played a central role.
Descriptions were provided for each of these events, and accident statistics were compared with those from the
earlier NTSB analysis. They found that crews faced the same basic challenges in more recent years--74% of recent
crew-related accident reports cited tactical decisions and 68% cited monitoring/challenging errors.
By the late 1990s, it became increasingly recognized that errors were only part of the safety picture and that
a broader understanding of all threats to safety was essential to develop effective responses, and several airlines
moved toward a threat and error management (TEM) model of safety interventions (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm,
2001). TEM is an organizational response to safety that includes analyses of operational data from line oriented
safety audits, flight data recorders, and crew self reports of hazardous situations. The goal is to understand and
manage threats to safe operations. From these data sources, several solutions may emerge, including changes in
operating procedures or equipment and tailored training interventions. This TEM approach in commercial aviation
training is recognized as a “best practice” by the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Air
Transport Association, the National Air Transport Association, and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.
In contrast to trends in airline safety, a recent Air Force review of accidents through 2009 revealed that
percentages attributed to human factors remained relatively constant at about 70% (Heupel, Gardetto, Dopslaf,

Hughes, Williams, & Johnson, 2010). A recent review of mishap rates across all Unites States military services
revealed little systematic improvement in mishap rates over the past 20 years (Unites States Coast Guard Safety
Center, 2009). O’Connor, Hahn, & Nullmeyer (2010) recently reviewed military Crew Resource Management
(CRM) training across both the United States armed services and other allied countries, and found no military
training programs today that pursue TEM as aggressively as has been the case in commercial aviation.
Air Mobility Command sponsored a series of efforts to better understand threats to safety for C-130J crews
and how these crews responded to those threats: (1) review relevant safety data; (2) survey mission qualified crews
to solicit accounts of “threats” to flight safety, some type of crew error, and/or a successful mitigation strategy or
technique; and (3) observe mission qualified crews perform a tactically demanding capstone simulator scenario
during annual refresher training. The overall objective was to provide actionable recommendations for updating C130J training to better reflect TEM concepts. The focus in this paper is on the first and third of these elements.
Results
Accident and Incident Trends.
The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) homepage (http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil) summarizes AIB reports
from Class A accidents (fatality or permanent disability, loss of aircraft, or more than $2 million damage). The Air
Force Safety Center (AFSC) home page (http://afsafety.af.mil/) provides considerable summary mishap statistical
information, including hours flown and mishap frequencies, by aircraft type and year. Flying hours per year are
essential for translating frequencies into mishap rates. AFSC also maintains an electronic database of accident
reports, as well as high accident potential and hazardous air traffic self-reports. Data from all of these sources were
used to review Air Force airlift mishap trends.
C-130 Class A mishap rates across all models fell consistently from 1970 through 2000, with .73 mishaps
per 100,000 flying hours in the 1970’s, .56 in the 1980’s, and .26 in the 1990’s. The rate increased slightly from
2000-2009, to .35 per 100,000 flying hours, and that pattern of slight increases in Class A mishap rates was common
throughout the Department of Defense. In response to rising mishap rates, all Services began a series of safety
initiatives in 2005. C-130 class A mishap rates dropped from 2.9 in 2001-2005 to 1.6 from 2006-2010, suggesting
that the safety initiatives may be proving successful. C-130J flight operations began in the late 1990’s. The C-130J
safety record compared to earlier C-130 models of is enviable – one Class A ground mishap in 2008. There have
been approximately 150 C-130 Class B mishaps in the past decade. Six of these involved a J model C-130, and of
these, only one involved crew factors. Two conclusions were drawn from these trends. First, the drop across the past
two decades that has been documented in air carrier human factors mishaps was not as pronounced in Air Force
accident data. Second, the C-130J community has had an enviable safety record to date.
We broadened the scope of mishap analyses to include C-130E and H Class A mishaps given the shared
tactical airlift mission, and to include C-17 mishaps given similarities in cockpit display technology. Mishaps
occurred from 1999 through 2009. In both of these other aircraft, numerous mishaps involved human error. There
were 13 C-130 E and H Class A mishaps, of which eleven had notable crew factors. Of 22 C-17 Class A mishaps,
nine involved notable crew factors. The top human factors in C-17, legacy C-130, and C-130 J mishaps are shown in
Table 1. For the C-130J, the human factors came from one Class B mishap and eight Class C mishaps.
The factors in Table 1 come from reports where human factors analyses were based on the Department of
Defense Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, or DoD HFACS. DoD HFACS is well documented in
multiple places, including the Navy and Coast Guard safety center web sites. Several patterns emerged from our
analysis. Inattention was frequently cited in both aircraft with highly automated cockpits (C-17 and C-130J) but not
legacy C-130 mishaps. A similar pattern emerged with the highly related factors of cognitive task oversaturation
and task misprioritization. Both refer to challenges with managing multiple tasks simultaneously. Risk assessment
and decision making are also highly related. HFACS distinguishes between risk assessment and decisions during
planning from those behaviors during mission execution. All three platforms cite this skill area during mission
execution. Violating stated rules shows up in all three lists. Procedural guidance/publications appears in C-17 and
C-130 accidents. A common theme when citing this factor is the difficulty keeping crews current given rapidly
changing tactics, techniques, and procedures. While this was not among the top factors in C-130J accident reports, it
has emerged as a common factor across the entire Air Force (Air force Safety Center, 2009).

Table 1. The Most Frequently Cited Mishap Human Factors in Three USAF Aircraft Types
C-17 (Class A)

C-130 E/H (Class A)

C-130J (Class B & C)

Risk assessment during operations Procedural guidance/publications Distraction
Procedural guidance/publications Risk assessment during operations Task misprioritization
Inattention

Mission planning

Decision making during operations

Cognitive task oversaturation

Planned inappropriate operations Checklist error

Channelized attention

Violation - lack of discipline

Violation - lack of discipline

Fatigue physiological mental

Channelized attention

Inattention

Planned inappropriate operations Local training

Complacency

Overcontrol/undercontrol

Necessary action delayed

Misperception of conditions

Violation - lack of discipline

Miscommunication

Breakdown in visual scan

Air Force crews are increasingly documenting near misses in flight or on the ground through Hazardous
Air Traffic Reports or HATRs. Over 700 HATRs have been submitted involving C-130s of all types from 1999
through 2009. Of these, 20 involved C-130J aircraft. HATRs tend to be short (about 2 pages) summaries of what
transpired. Air Traffic Control errors were cited in half of these HATRS, and errors by other pilots were cited in
most others. C-130J crew errors were contributing factors in only two of these incidents, further supporting the need
to address externally generated threats to safety, rather than focus solely on C-130J in-cockpit error.
Crew Performance in a Simulator-Based Tactical Scenario.
Participants: Twenty mission qualified C-130J crews were observed as they planned a realistic, tactically
complex mission; executed that mission in a full crew, high fidelity weapon system trainer; and debriefed the
mission. A C-130J crew consists of an aircraft commander (AC), a co-pilot (CP), and a loadmaster (LM).
The Scenario: Annual refresher training for C-130J crews builds up to an exercise where mission qualified
crews plan a challenging tactical airlift mission and then execute it in a C-130J Weapon System Trainer, a full crew,
high fidelity simulator. An Afghanistan scenario was used in this study. It was specifically designed to interject a
number of “threats” or problems to the crews, beginning in planning and continuing throughout the mission. For
example, in planning, a Block 5.4 aircraft was specified. This has weight, fuel, and takeoff performance implications
that should be considered during planning. Ground threats enroute and around the landing zone were briefed, and the
landing zone runway sloped steeply on one end. During execution, challenges included fairly stringent altitude
restrictions in the initial climb-out, a marked shift in wind direction affecting an already demanding approach to the
landing zone, selected equipment failure, lack of unloading equipment where cargo was being delivered, a cargo
fire, and loss of an engine that necessitated a divert decision. Many similar challenges were mentioned by crews in
our real-world TEM survey.
Data Collection. Crew performance was independently rated by two observers who used structured data
collection forms that were tailored to the scenario being observed. All ratings were based on five-point behaviorally
anchored scales, ranging from 1= poor to 5 = exceptional. One observer rated crew CRM processes during three
phases of the exercise (planning, execution, and debrief). A second observer rated crew performance. CRM ratings
addressed the six Air Force Instruction 11-290 content areas of mission evaluation, task management, situation
awareness, crew coordination, communication, and risk management/decision making. Crew performance during
planning was rated as seven separately graded items contingency considerations, takeoff and landing data (TOLD),
and decision quality, among others. During execution, 14 items were rated including use of automation, checklists,
time control, aircraft handling, response to emergencies. The two observers rated their respective areas
independently, and did not compare scores or try to reach consensus.

Data Analysis. An initial analysis of the C-130J simulator refresher study data addressed the relationships
between ratings that were assigned by the observer for crew process and the observer for mission performance.
Subsequent analyses addressed (1) how well the 20 crews handled the “threats” that were administered to them
during the session, (2) observer comments that characterize the process behaviors of the most and least successful
crews, and (3) the influence of demographic background on CRM behaviors and mission performance.
Overall Ratings. One major question to be answered is the degree to which CRM crew processes predicted
mission performance. Figure 1 provides a graphic of the mission execution data from the 20 crews in which the xaxis corresponds to the average CRM process rating received with the y-axis indicating mission performance. Since
some crews have identical ratings for CRM process and mission performance, we have indicated multiple crew
presence by making the dot bigger with a circle around it. Also, each crew in that position is identified by a crew
number above and to the right of the dot. A sizeable positive correlation was observed between crew process and
mission performance (r = .60, t = 3.17, df = 18, p < .01). In keeping with this relationship, the majority of the crew
plots should be located in quadrants I and III. Indeed, from Figure 1 we can see that only one crew, Crew #12, is
found in Quadrant II, which is indicative of higher mission performance (average = 4) than would be predicted
based on their CRM process rating (average = 2). No crews are found in Quadrant IV (lower performance, higher
process). Moreover, two other crews can be said to have a “mismatch” between CRM process and mission
performance, as defined by a difference in rating greater than 1 unit. These are Crew #7 (process = 3, performance =
1) and Crew #10 (process = 4.5, performance = 3). The remaining 17 crews are in line with a consistency in ratings
between CRM process and mission performance. In fact, 11 of our 20 crews have identical ratings for CRM and
performance, either (2, 2) (Crew #4, 11, 13, 14, 20), (3, 3) (Crew #3, 19), (4, 4) (Crew #6, 8, 15), or (5, 5) (Crew
#17). For the most part, then, crews that have better CRM process behaviors had better mission performance.
Characteristics of “Strong” and “Weak” Crews. We can use this consistency between CRM and
performance to unequivocally identify the strongest and weakest refresher crews during this scenario. Specifically,
we labeled the crews whose process-performance plots fall high in Quadrant I as our strongest crews. Looking at
Figure 1, we can see by this definition that our four “strong” crews are: #6, 8, 15, and 17. Similarly, we looked to
crew plots in Quadrant IV for our “weak” crews. Here, we had five such crews: #4, 11, 13, 14, and 20. In subsequent
analyses, we examined the observer protocols for the strongest crews to identify best practice CRM behaviors and
corresponding mission performance elements that are representative of what the most successful crews do. In like
fashion, we extracted typical crew interaction breakdowns, errors, and associated problems with our weakest crews
to generate a list of “avoid these” behaviors. Several highlight of that analysis follow:
 Higher quality mission planning, both in terms of time spent and activities performed, resulted in superior
performance. Strong crews tended to plan for the most likely contingencies, particularly with regard to go-arounds at
the LZ. Indeed, we observed that thorough LZ study was a key performance-determinant in the study.
 Without exception, the most successful crews in the simulator study treated and utilized the LM as an
integral part of the crew throughout the mission. Indeed, we found that effective utilization of the LM was a notable
predictor of mission performance in its own right. Thus, it is quite clear that the C-130J, despite its advanced
automation, is a true 3-person cockpit (at least during parts of the mission) rather than a 2- or 2.5-person cockpit.
 The ability of crews to program and re-program take-off and landing data (TOLD) during the mission was a
major determinant of success. In particular, crews who accepted the TOLD data given them in planning without
verification suffered high workload later as the threats began to mount up. Moreover, failure to check data and
verify calculations caused some serious problems during LZ approach and landing, resulting in a less successful
mission. Strong crews actively calculated and verified as much TOLD data as possible while on the ground.
 Effective set-up and use of automation was a major characteristic of successful crews and its absence was
typically a reliable predictor of poor performance. From our analysis of the simulator study data, it became clear that
automation use is a continuum in which either extreme – over-reliance on automation to the exclusion of pilotage
skills or under-utilization such that the pilot spends the majority of his/her time hand flying – will result in degraded
performance. Indeed, several crews where the aircraft commander rarely used the autopilot were extremely tasksaturated, resulting in poor mission performance.

Figure 1. Crew plots of average crew process and mission performance ratings.
 Fortunately, most crew members took the mission seriously, not just as a simulator session, and did their
best throughout. However, there were several crews who treated the mission as a typical CONUS operation despite
the clear difficulties described during planning. This attitude, coupled with a lack of clear leadership and a closed or
partly-closed environment for crew member inputs, creates a bad mix for conducting a mission and, not surprisingly,
crews with such an attitude scored at the bottom on mission performance.
Crew Demographics and Mission Performance. Average C-130 flying hours for both C-130J and legacy
C-130 are shown in Table 2 for members of both stronger and weaker crews. Comparing the top two rows, we see
that there are some fairly sizeable differences between the two groups in average experience. However, because the
within-group variances are also fairly large, we elected to perform independent t-tests to determine if any of these
differences reached statistical significance. The bottom row depicts the probability of a significant difference given a
t-test with seven degrees of freedom. As can be seen, the only significant strong vs weak crew difference is for the
LM legacy C-130 hours. Specifically, crews whose LM’s had a large number of legacy C-130 flying hours were
more likely to part of a crew that was classified “weak” rather than “strong.” Crews where the LM had extensive
legacy C-130 experience – where the LM was viewed as a backend crewmember only – were at a disadvantage.
Table 2. Average Flight Experience for “Strong” and “Weak” Study Crews.
Average AC
Other C-130
Hours

Average CP
C-130J Hours

Average CP
Other C-130
Hours

Average LM
C-130J
Hours

Average LM
Other C-130
Hours

Average
Total J
Hours

Strong 1138

1556

968

745

1326

417

3431

Weak 930

910

896

1410

1660

1890

3486

46

.86

.43

.30

.03

.93

Crew
Classification

p-value (based
on indep t-test)

Average AC
C-130J
Hours

.63 .

Implications for Training
The C-130 Hercules aircraft has been in production for over 50 years, serves untold missions, and is
utilized by numerous services around the world. The advancements in aircraft technology were minor when
compared to the introduction of the “J” version. The “classic” C-130 typically required a crew of four in the cockpit,
and, for the USAF, two LMs in the cargo compartment. Appropriate flying speeds, fuel endurance, route headings

and weight and balance of cargo were calculated manually using charts and slide-rule technology. The navigators
used sextants for overwater route navigation into the ‘80s, slowly replaced by INS and GPS systems. The C-130J
reduced the flight crew to two pilots and one loadmaster by taking advantage of advances in computers and avionics.
The military mission, however, became more complex. It only stood to reason that the skill-sets taught to
the legacy aircrews needed to change, and perhaps since a flight engineer and navigator are no longer in the cockpit
does not mean their activities are no longer required. On the contrary, the tasks of the past exist; those and many
more are now within the computers on board. The LMs no longer crank a bicycle chain to unlock cargo or
physically remove a connecting link to fully lower the aft ramp; remote electric switches now perform that task.
Training aircrews to understand and interface with the computers that operation the aircraft systems will be the
major challenges to convert legacy crews to the automated operating system. This report confirmed that the pilot’s
prowess with the automation is a key requirement for training. Workload management, even with the aid of
automated systems, can still overwhelm a 2-pilot crew. It would seem advisable, then, to encourage the 3-person
cockpit concept during refresher training, particularly for crews where extensive legacy C-130 experience is present.
When considering the emerging objective of TEM, adaptability will become a key skill for the crews. Tactical
airlift, by its nature, includes short-notice changes to the planned mission.
This report clearly indicates the need for increased training in the understanding and use of automation to
ensure pilots are fluent in the operating system of the flight management computers, and the 3 crewmembers
perform with naturalistic synergy. Loadmasters are no longer just “cargo-guys in the back” but now must play a key
role in supporting cockpit activities, particularly in times of high taskloads and changes in mission requirements.
While the C-130J aircraft is a significant advancement in aircraft technology, it demands equally significant changes
in CRM skills. These changes call for increased mission performance training, as a crew, in realistic simulator
scenarios. To address this, the C-130J training system for the USAF will introduce a thoroughly revised training
curricula beginning FY 2012. This new plan will incorporate a new part-task trainer that emulates the automated
operations of the flight deck. These training aids will concentrate on automation-management skills that are
currently taught during simulator lessons. Loadmaster fuselage trainers will also have these training aids to allow the
loadmaster students opportunity to acquire proficiency in the cockpit tasks needed to support the pilots prior to their
joining the pilots in the flight simulators. This shift in training will allow a reduction of simulator events within the
training program, and allow the simulator missions to focus more on CRM and mission-accomplishment skills by
the entire crew, for which the full crew, full-motion simulator is better suited.
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